

# Partner Alliance for Safer Schools – Guidelines and Assessment Tools

Mark Williams Vice Chair Partner Alliance for Safer Schools (PASS)



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### **About Me**

#### **Mark Williams**

- 30+ years in the security and safety industry
- Partner Alliance for Safer Schools Vice Chair
- Secure Schools Alliance Advisor
- NFPA 3000 ASHER (Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response) Technical Committee Member
- Code Instructor State of Michigan 15 years
- Allegion 24 years
  - Vice President Architectural and Construction Services
  - Project Based Business Team Leader
  - Regional Director
  - General Sales Manager
  - Architectural Consultant



**Campus Safety** 

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
Reviewing Statewide School Facility and Building Safety and Security Standards

www.policefoundation.org

June 2018

### **About Police Foundation**

- National organization founded in 1970
- Independent, Non-partisan, Non-profit & Non-member
- Aims to Advance Policing Through Innovation & Science, Increase Public Safety and Strengthen Communities
- Grounded in Science, Experience & Evidence- Based Practices, While Embracing Innovation & New Ideas



### **Police Foundation Statement of Work**

Received contract from Secure Schools Alliance Research and Education to complete following tasks:

- Task #1: Conduct a State-by-State Legislative Review
- Task #2: Identify States with Security and Emergency Planning Standards
- Task #3: Conduct a Review of Statewide School Building and Facility Security Standards/Requirements
- Task #4: Conduct a Review of Statewide Promising Practices, Recommendations, Guidelines, and Resources


### Methodology

- Worked with the Alliance to identify promising practices
- Reviewed publicly-available materials including:
  - Legislation and proposals
  - Guidelines, assessment tools, toolkits, resources, etc.
  - Open source media
- Synthesized findings
- Conducting presentations to refine information
  - All information is current as of September 11, 2018
- Working with the Alliance to develop deliverables for relevant stakeholders

### Task 1: State-by-State Legislative Review

- 47 states have legislation
- State legislation is difficult to find
- "Safe Schools" generally means free of bullying, drugs, and guns
- Challenges are similar but the solutions are across the spectrum
  - Many states still rely on/link to federal government and NGOs to produce guidelines and resources
- Many states have general exercises/scenarios/toolkits/trainings but no publiclyavailable guidance


### **State School Safety/Security Legislation**




## Task 2: States with Security and Emergency Planning Standards

- 46 require school emergency plans
- 45 require training and/or drills on emergency plans
- 27 require school facility security audits/assessments
- 25 have established school safety centers
- 17 have established standards for school facility security
- 11 provide grants for school security

### **Require Safety and/or Emergency Plans**




### **Require Safety and/or Emergency Training/Drills**




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### **Require School Security Facility Audit/Assessment**




### **State School Safety Centers**



### **Established Guidelines/Standards for School Facility Security**




### **State Security Grants to Schools**



### **Task 3: Review of Statewide Requirements**

 16 passed legislation or code establishing statewide standards/requirements for school facility security prior to Feb. 14, 2018. (DE has since passed legislation)




### **High-Level Requirements Findings**

- Difficult to find not always with school legislation
- Vary significantly in number and focus
  - About half don't focus on facilities
- Few states include clear repercussions for not meeting requirements
- Many states have general exercises/scenarios/toolkits/trainings but no publicly-available guidance
- Some states have requirements and recommendations

# **Most Common Facility Security Requirements**

- Restricted Visitor Access and Sign In (8 states)
- Interior Access Controls/Locks (8 states)
- Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) (7 states)
- Two-Way Communication in Every Room (7 states)
- Exterior Access Controls (7 states)
- Panic/Emergency Notification Systems (5 states)
- Electronic Surveillance (5 states)
- Bullet/Blast Resistant Materials (5 states)
- Staff and Student IDs (3 states)

### **Requirement: Interior Access Controls/Locks**




### **Requirement: Exterior Access Controls**



### **Requirement: CPTED**



### **Requirement: Bullet/Blast Resistant Materials**




### **Requirement: Electronic Surveillance**



### **Task 4: Review of Statewide Recommendations**

• 20 states had recommendations, guidelines, and/or resources prior to Feb. 2018



### **High-Level Recommendations Findings**

- Vary significantly in number and focus
  - Emergency plans, trainings, and drills
  - SROs/safety teams
  - Mental health
  - Many lack clarity and specificity or implementation steps
  - Majority don't address facilities in meaningful ways
  - Provide exercises/scenarios/toolkits/assessments but no solutions
- At different stages
  - State legislatures introducing bills/funding
  - Governors appointing task forces
  - Reviewing current resources
  - 7 states have passed legislation since Feb. 2018

### **Most Common Facility Security Recommendations**

- Create District/School Safety Teams (17 states)
- Building/Door Design and Materials (15 states)
- Additional Drills and Training (15 states)
- CPTED (13 states)
- Controlled Access (13 states)
- Funding to purchase safety equipment/technology (13 states)
- Funding for SROs/safety personnel in every school (11 states)
- Incorporate NIMS/ICS (10 states)
- State-Level Training/Technical Assistance Body (10 states)
- Two-Way Communications with First Responders (9 states)

### Agenda



- Who is PASS Vision and Mission
- Defining K12 Challenges
- PASS Guidelines and Tools
- Concept of:
  - Layered Security
  - Components
  - TIER(s)
- Where to Start
- Security Team
- Additional Information



A not for profit coalition of organizations and individuals from the **education**, **public safety** and **industry** communities, brought together to develop and support best practice recommendations for school safety and security across multiple disciplines.

### **PASS Steering Committee**

- Industry Associations
- Safe Schools Organization Leaders
- Parents

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- K12 Security Directors
- Security Consultant
- School Architect (Principal, Education Studio)
- Model Code Committee Members (NFPA)
- Security/Systems Integrator Consultants
- Security Product Manufacturer Consultants



SCHOOLS







PASS supports efforts by communities throughout the United States to provide and sustain an <u>effective level</u> of security <u>appropriate</u> to each district and K-12 facility, recognizing that making schools safer is <u>both</u> <u>achievable and urgently needed</u>.


### **Our Mission**

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To provide school administrators, school boards, public safety and security officials with a roadmap and guidelines for implementing a <u>layered and tiered</u> approach to enhancing the safety and security of their school environments. The PASS Guidelines and Checklist tools help stakeholders to answer two questions:

- What should we do?
- How do we prioritize?

- A means to measure current facility security with best practices despite the general lack of standards and legislative or regulatory requirements
- Identification of specific actions that can be taken to raise the baseline of security
- Information on vetted security practices specific to K-12 environments
- How to distinguish between needed and effective solutions from sales pitches
- Identification of multiple options for addressing security needs, based on available resources



Tiered Approach



### **Industry Partner Program**

# As a nonprofit organization PASS relies on a coalition of organizational partners to support use of its tools and resources and communicate our vision and mission. Solutions providers working daily to meet the needs of schools around the country are key partners in this effort.



#### Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for Industry Partners

As a nonprofit organization PASS relies on a coalition of organizational partners to support use of its tools and resources and communicate our vision and mission. Solutions providers working daily to meet the needs of schools around the country are key partners in this effort.

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Our Vision - PASS supports efforts by communities throughout the United States to provide and sustain an effective level or safety appropriate to each district and K-12 facility, recognizing that making schools safer is both achievable and urgently needed.

<u>Our Mission</u> - To provide school administrators, school boards and public safety and security professionals with information, tools and insight needed to implement a layered and tiered approach to securing and enhancing the safety of school environments based on local needs, nationwise best practices, and effective utilization of available resources.

To effectively work together in support these objectives, it's important to establish mutual expectations to ensure our partnerships will support the vision and mission of PASS.

#### What you can expect from PASS:

PASS is committed to preparing and supporting industry partners to work constructively in the K-12 environment by providing:

- Periodic updates to the Guidelines, Checklist and other resources to ensure they are current and as relevant as
  possible to K-12 needs.
- Eligibility for participation in a committee of advisors tasked with ensuring the above, subject to approval by the PASS steering committee.
- · A well maintained, professional website, including a listing of PASS partners with links.
- PASS-related collateral in electronic form, and permission to use (unaltered) PASS materials, images and logos.
- On-site and web-based training for your personnel regarding how to use PASS resources, as necessary and available.
- · Support for your events (electronic) collateral and in-person presenters (depending on availability).

#### Industry Partner Expectations:

- Industry partners should be able to articulate and present to school safety and security stakeholders.
  - What is PASS, its vision and mission.
  - The basic concepts in the PASS Guidelines including its
     Lavered Security Model
    - Safety and Security Components
    - Tiered Best Practices
    - PASS Checklist
  - o The various ways in which utilization of the Guidelines are recommended.
- · Ensure that personnel working with schools complete a training session provided by PASS, as available.
- Maintain a designated point of contact for PASS partnership and related communications.

### **A Survivor's Story**







### **Current State:**


- Students will spend 11,500 hours in K-12 careers
- School Infrastructure is on average 45 years old (100K+ existing buildings)
- Schools should adopt proven methods over cheap, untested gadgets

### **Experts Recommend:**

- 1. Focus on Reliable Practices
- 2. Lockdown/All Hazards Strategies
- 3. Plan, Prepare, Practice

### **Defining Violence in the K-12 Market**





Sources: National Center for Educational Statistics, FBI



### **31 School Shootings Since Parkland**





- Shooting must involve at least one person being shot (not including the shooter)
- Shooting must occur on school property, which includes but is not limited to buildings, fields, parking lots, stadiums and buses
- We included gang violence, fights and domestic violence, but our count is
   not limited to those categories
- We included the accidental discharge of a firearm as long as the first two parameters are met -- except when the sole shooter is a law enforcement or security officer

CNN, February 14, 2019

### **Defining Violence in the K-12 Market**






Sources: National Center for Educational Statistics, 2018



## **Defining Violence in the K-12 Market**

Source:









### **Safe2Tell Statistics**

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437 Safe2Tell (tip line) Incidents - July 1st 2018 - May 1st 2019				
Alcohol	10	Knives	4	
Anger Issues	2	Misuse of Safe2Tell	4	
Assaults	7	Planned Parties	3	
Bullying	32	Planned School Attack	9	
Child Abuse	10	Prank Call	1	
Crime Stoppers	2	School Complaint	17	
Cutting	26	Sexting	4	
Cyber Bullying	9	Sexual Assault	8	
Dating Violence	1	Sexual misconduct	5	
Depression	21	Tobacco	19	
Discrimination	2	Suicide Threats	124	
Ditching	1	Theft	1	
Drugs	49	Threats	16	
Duplicate Report	19	Transportation Complaint	1	
Eating Disorder	3	Unsafe Driving	2	
Fighting	2	Weapons	2	
Guns	6	Welfare Check	10	
Harassment	5	Total Incidents	437	



- Can't Happen Here
- Not in the Budget
- Don't Want Schools to Feel Like Prisons










### **Review - Path to Increasing Levels of Safety & Security**



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
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# PASS Guidelines

#### **PASS Safety & Security Guidelines Contents**



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### Scope




Pg. 5

- The primary focuses of the PASS Guidelines are physical security and life safety, and recommendations are limited to related policies, procedures, equipment and technology.
- The Guidelines do not address other aspects of prevention often associated with school safety, such as mental health, behavioral threat assessment or policies related to firearms.
- Likewise, many areas of response and recovery are the purview of law enforcement and other emergency responders. Great care has been taken to ensure consistency with and avoid unnecessary duplication of important recent work in these areas, such as the National Fire Protection Association's (NFPA's) *NFPA 3000 Standard for an Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response (ASHER) Program.*

PASS does not make product-specific recommendations




#### LAYERS OF PROTECTION



#### **PASS Layers and Components**



#### LAYERS OF PROTECTION



	Components of Layers
1	Policies & Procedures
2	People (roles and training)
3	Architectural
4	Communication
5	Access Control
6	Video Surveillance
7	Alarms



	_		TIER 1	TIER 2	TIER 3	TIER 4	Tier Continuu
	膏	CLASSROOM/INTERIOR PERIMETER					• Layers
		COMMUNICATION					• Components
г	•	» Public Address System	-	-	-	~	
-	•	» E-911 Added to Phone System (No Codes)	~	-	-	-	
	•	» Two-way Intercom System With Call Buttons		-	1	-	
	•	» Duress Button System - Office and Classroom		-	1	~	
Best	•	» In-Building Emergency Communication System			1	~	
Practices -	•	» Distributed Antenna System (DAS)			٢	*	
		» Mass Notification Tied to District-Wide System			1	1	
		» Building-Wide Communication via Outside Calls				-	
		» Use of Mobile Applications and Social Media				-	





# **Recommended Uses**

- Support Risk Assessment and Development of Comprehensive Security Plans
- Grant Proposal Development
- School Safety and Security Standard
- Avoiding Pitfalls



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# **Avoiding Pitfalls**



#### **TOP 10 K-12 SAFETY AND SECURITY PITFALLS:**

1.	Failure to assemble a planning team (see Policies and Procedures) that includes all appropriate and necessary stakeholders
2.	Insufficient prioritization of security based on an "it won't happen here" mentality
3.	Implementation of advanced technology and/or high-cost solutions without first ensuring baseline, proven security measures are in place (such as those found in TIER 1 in the PASS Guidelines)
4.	Inconsistent implementation of disparate systems that do not meet security objectives identified in a comprehensive security plan or risk assessment
5.	Short-sighted planning or products that respond only to the latest tragedy, as opposed to supporting a long-term, holistic approach
6.	Choosing lowest-cost solutions above all other considerations, such as total life cycle costs
7.	Reliance on technology for emergency communications that is not designed for such use
8.	Overreliance on a single form of emergency communication or overdependence on a single type of solution or technology to address a broad range of safety and security challenges
9.	Failure to appropriately balance external and internal risk mitigation—Based on risk assessment, different approaches may be more appropriate, depending on the facility. With active shooter events, for example, 100 percent of such incidents targeting elementary schools have been perpetrated by intruders from outside the school communities, while approximately 75 percent of incidents at secondary schools involved students or others associated with the schools. <sup>®</sup>
10.	Unnecessary products that can be solutions in search of a problem. The recent proliferation of "barricade" or "secondary locking" devices is just one example. Offering no advantage over a modern lockset," such devices are typically offered as a lowest-cost lockdown solution, in violation of fire and life safety codes and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).



- 1. Failure to assemble a planning team that includes all appropriate and necessary stakeholders (see Policies and Procedures)
- 2. Insufficient prioritization of security based on the mentality of "It won't happen here".
- 3. Implementation of advanced technology and/or high cost solutions with out first ensuring baseline, proven security measures are in place (ie., TIER 1 best practices found in Guidelines)
- 4. Inconsistent implementation of disparate systems that do not meet security objectives identified in a comprehensive security plan or risk assessment
- 5. Short sighted planning or products that respond only to the latest tragedy, as opposed to supporting a long term, holistic approach



- 6. Prioritizing lowest cost as opposed to life cycle cost
- 7. Reliance on technology for emergency communications that is not designed for such use
- 8. Overreliance on a single form of emergency communication or overdependence on a single type of solution or technology to address a broad range of safety and security challenges
- 9. Failure to appropriately balance external and internal risk mitigation depending on facility type. ie., elementary versus secondary buildings
- 10. Unnecessary products that are solutions in search of a problem. ie., barricade devices

# Solutions in Search of a Problem



"Decisions about whether to invest in school security technology for a school or school district are complex," the Johns Hopkins study said. "Many choices about the technology selected, however, may be made with incomplete information or with information that is influenced more by political or reactionary consideration than by local conditions."

## **Barricade Devices**



Many of these products not only violate current life safety code requirements, but they could also result in increased risk and liability.



The Sandy Hook Commission noted there are no documented instances of an active shooter breaching a locked classroom door

The Marjory Stoneman Douglas Commission Report also noted that the shooter never entered a classroom

### **Barricade Devices and ADA**

• 2010 ADA Standards provide as follows:

#### 205.1 [Operable Parts] General

 Operable parts on accessible elements, accessible routes, and in accessible rooms and spaces shall comply with 309.

#### 309.4 Operation

 Operable parts shall be operable with one hand and shall not require tight grasping, pinching, or twisting of the wrist. The force required to activate operable parts shall be 5 pounds (22.2 N) maximum.

#### 404.1 [Doors, Doorways, and Gates] General

 Doors, doorways, and gates that are part of an accessible route shall comply with 404

#### 404.2.7 Door and Gate Hardware

• Handles, pulls, latches, locks, and other operable parts on doors and gates shall comply with 309.4. Operable parts of such hardware shall be 34 inches (865 mm) minimum and 48 inches (1220 MM) maximum above the finish floor or ground. Where sliding doors are in the fully open position, operating hardware shall be exposed and usable from both sides.



- Evidence for Barricade Devices
  - O documented instances of devices being deployed or used to stop adversarial behavior
- Evidence Against Barricading Classrooms/Buildings
  - Virginia Tech 32 dead, 23 injured
  - Platte Canyon 2 deaths
  - West Nickel Mines 5 deaths


PASS Whitepaper - passk12.org/resources

# Challenges

Solutions are Multifaceted and Complex


#### **Integrated Safe Schools Systems - Solution Complexity**








### **School Safety and Security is Multifaceted and Complex**





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### **District Wide Layer**



Leadership and coordination at the district level are integral to the successful development and adoption of school safety processes, plans, technologies and procedures and for ensuring these measures are updated for consistency with evolving best practices.

Most schools safety measures have district-wide components or responsibilities. It is critical for districts to understand the fundamental link between readiness for day to day emergencies and disaster preparedness. School districts that are well prepared for individual emergencies involving students or staff members are more likely to be prepared for complex events like a community disaster or an active shooter incident. In the Guidelines, PASS outlines the components and best practices along the TIER Continuum at the district-wide level that schools and school districts can use in addressing a wide range of emergency situations that impact school safety, such as incidents of natural disasters, violence, mental health and medical emergencies.

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#### Property Perimeter Layer Campus Safety CONFERENCE 2019

The property perimeter layer begins at the school property boundary and extends to the parking lot. This area includes playgrounds, sporting fields and other facilities that are often used by the public after school business hours end.

The physical security of a school facility begins at the property perimeter, where the most outwardly visible security deterrents to an external threat can be implemented.

The boundary should be clear to the public and provide visible notice of the rules and responsibilities for individuals entering school property.



# Parking Lot Perimeter Layer Campus Safe

Within the parking lot perimeter, staff, students and visitors park their vehicles or arrive and depart by bus or other means. Just like the property perimeter layer, the parking lot perimeter should always be clearly defined. In many cases, this area is where schools experience the most safety issues. Falls, car accidents, dangerous driving, theft, vandalism and assault are just some of the events that can take place in these areas.



The building perimeter layer begins with school grounds adjacent to the exterior structure of a building and consists of the perimeter of a building itself, including the exterior doors and windows of a school. Securing a building perimeter can range from simple to complex, especially for middle schools or high schools with multiple buildings/open campuses. Key safety and security functions take place within this layer, as it encompasses all areas where people enter and exit a school building.






The classroom/interior perimeter layer consists of a school's entire interior, including not only classrooms but also gymnasiums, cafeterias, media centers, etc. This is both the last layer of defense against external threats and, often, the first protection against internal threats to student, staff and visitor safety.





#### LAYERS OF PROTECTION





# SAFETY AND SECURITY COMPONENTS

- Policies and Procedures
- People (Roles and Training)
- Architectural
- Communication
- Access Control
- Video Surveillance
- Detection and Alarms



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# **Policies and Procedures Component**

- The policies and procedures component involves a school or district's emergency operations plan (EOP) and security plans.
- Comprehensive security plans, and the policies and procedures created to implement them, <u>form the foundation</u> of school safety and security.
- Without proper policies and procedures in place, it is <u>impossible to</u> <u>successfully use security technology and other security measures</u>, regardless of how advanced they may be.
- Effective policies and procedures alone can mitigate risks, and there are often <u>no costs associated with implementing them</u>.
- Essential security-specific policies and processes relevant to each layer are categorized under TIER 1 as foundational best practices.



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Personnel (vigilant staff and students) make up <u>the most</u> <u>important component of each layer</u>. To individuals with criminal intent, such vigilance is an effective deterrent. ALL students and staff should be empowered to take effective action in emergencies and receive appropriate training and instructions relevant to a school or district's safety processes, plans, technologies and procedures.







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## **Planning, Preparing and Practicing Saves Lives**







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# **Drills And Practice Save Lives**





Marjory Stoneman Douglas – First Floor

# **Drills And Practice Save Lives**





Marjory Stoneman Douglas – Third Floor



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There are many architectural considerations that can enhance the security and safety plans for school buildings. Using Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles is critical to efforts by districts and their architects in designing buildings and grounds that enhance safety and security. Buildings should be designed to have natural surveillance (sight lines), territorial reinforcement (designated public, semi-private and private areas) and access control. The architectural component also includes collecting and sharing critical information about school facilities for mitigation and response to emergencies.



# **Sandy Hook Elementary**





# **Sandy Hook Elementary**





# **Communication Component**

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Emergency communication is vital to the safety and security of the staff and students in our schools. It is important to distinguish between emergency and routine communication systems. An **emergency communication system** is defined by NFPA 72 (the national fire alarm and signaling code) as "a system for the protection of life by indicating the existence of an emergency situation and communicating information necessary to facilitate an appropriate response and action." **Routine communication systems** handle day-to-day communication on all matters outside this definition.

The use of dedicated emergency communication systems and technologies is essential. Normal business telephone, email and social media apps designed for routine communication are not adequate for critical communication during an emergency events unless they are specially configured for this purpose in a code-compliant manner.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks and the 2011 tornado in Joplin, Missouri, are two of many examples in which these routine communication technologies failed during emergency situations.



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Controlling access to school property, buildings and classrooms is a basic security function and responsibility of school administrators. Mechanical locks have historically formed the base for any access control system, but there are other critical elements to consider. Many schools and districts have invested in electronic access control features that allow for enhanced security. Modern access control systems and procedures offer an effective solution to preventing unauthorized intruders from accessing a building during school hours and for monitoring access points for the various layers.



# Video Surveillance Component



A video surveillance system is a component of any school or district security program, providing deterrence and detection and, in more advanced implementations, enhancing response to a variety of daily challenges experienced at schools.

In the past, video recordings were used primarily in a forensic capacity to help determine the who, what, when and where of an incident after the fact. As surveillance technology has advanced, so have capabilities that allow security professionals to leverage video as a proactive tool to help mitigate risks before and as they occur. Much of this capability has been enabled through the widespread use and increasing affordability of internet protocol (IP) cameras over the past decade.

It is very important to note that, in video surveillance, there is no such thing as a "onesize-fits-all" approach. Designing a quality video surveillance system can be complicated and requires a collaborative approach involving multiple professionals.



# **Alarms and Detection Component**

"Detection and alarms" refers to technology used to detect and/or report an emergency event. Traditional intrusion detection systems represent a key platform that has evolved beyond burglar alarms to provide the capability to report other types of emergencies and support an all-hazards approach to safety and security.

The most important aspect of detection and alarm systems is that they provide the technological means to easily translate the detection of a security threat to a strategic notification that best fits with the processes and protocols put in place to respond to the threats that schools face.



**Campus Safetv** 


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
# Step 1 – Assemble a Team

- Security Director
- School Administrator
- Security Consultant
- IT Director
- Local Police and Fire



### Security..... It Takes a Team

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# <u>Step 2 – Risk Assessment</u>

 Most buildings across the district will have unique risk profiles Free Risk Assessments available from number of sources:


- Local Police and Fire
- DHS
- Independent Consultants
- Security Design Consultants
- Internal Assessment using free tools
- Assessments by local SME's

# **Risk Assessment – A Prerequisite**



Once a team is established, a risk assessment is the next step toward developing a comprehensive security plan and thus a prerequisite for decisions regarding deployment of security solutions.

- Three terms to understand:
  - Threat What we are trying to protect assets against (people, property, etc.)
  - Vulnerability A gap in our protection efforts
  - Risk The intersection of Threats and Vulnerabilities







### <u>Step 3 – Building</u> <u>Assessment by Layer</u>

- Use PASS Checklist by building and by layer
  - District Wide Layer
  - Property Perimeter Layer
  - Parking Lot Layer
  - Building Perimeter Layer
  - Classroom/Interior Perimeter Layer

	LAYER/COMPONENTS/BEST PRACTICES	TIER 1	TIER 2	TIER 3	TIER 4	Our Status			
<u> 220</u>	DISTRICT-WIDE					Achieved	In	Future	Not
	VIDEO SURVEILLANCE					Aciliereu	Progress	Need	Required
	» Use and Data Retention Policy	1	~	~	~				
	» MOUs with Law Enforcement for Sharing Video Data	1	~	~	~				
	» Incorporation of Video Surveillance Into Emergency Response Plans	1	1	-	-				
	» Camera Standardization		~	~	~				
	» Recording System Standardization			~	~				
	» Video Verification of Alarms to Monitoring Service or Security Operations Center (SOC)				1				





		TIER 1	TIER 2	TIER 3	TIER 4	Our Status			
른	CLASSROOM/INTERIOR PERIMETER LAYER					Achieved	In	Future	Not
	POLICIES AND PROCEDURES					Acilieveu	Progress	Need	Required
	» Classroom Doors Closed and Locked When Occupied	٢	1	٧	×				
	PEOPLE (ROLES AND TRAINING)								
	» Teachers, Staff and Substitutes Trained on Emergency Protocols	٢	~	1	1				
	ARCHITECTURAL								
	» Security Film on Door Vision Panels and Sidelites	٢	1	1	1				
	» "Narrow-Lite" Style Classroom Doors with Blinds	٢	1	1	1				
	» Compartmentalize Building with Cross-Corridor Doors	٢	1	1	1				
	» Reinforced Walls at Shelter in Place Areas (New Construction)	٢	1	٧	1				
	» Safety/Security Optimization of Classroom Door Installation (New Construction)	1	-	1	-				




# <u>Step 4 – Establish Documents and Budgets Based on</u> <u>Checklist Selections</u>

	LAYER/COMPONENTS/BEST PRACTICES	TIER 1	TIER 2	TIERTIEROur Status234					
<u>250</u>	DISTRICT-WIDE					Achieved	In	Future	Not
	VIDEO SURVEILLANCE						Progress	Need	Required
	» Use and Data Retention Policy	/	/	~	~				
	» MOUs with Law Enforcement for Sharing Video Data	-	-	~	-				
	» Incorporation of Video Surveillance Into Emergency Response Plans	/	/	~	~				
	» Camera Standardization		-	~	-				
	» Recording System Standardization			~	~				
	» Video Verification of Alarms to Monitoring Service or Security Operations Center (SOC)				~				







### » QUICKFIND

	District-Wide Best Practices	
⇒	Policies and Procedures Component	.20
	Visitor Management System	. 26
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DISTRICT WIDE LATER				
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES				
» School and District Emergency Protocols & Responsibilities Defined	-	-	-	~
» Dedicated Security Director/Department	-	-	-	~
» Climate and Cultural Survey of Stakeholders	-	-	-	~
» Establishment of Safety Policies and Procedures	~	~	~	~
» Sharing Maps and Other Facility Information With Law Enforcement, Fire and EMS	-	~	-	~
» District-Wide Physical Security Standards	-	~	-	~
» Annual Physical Security Assessments Based on District-Wide Standards	-	-	-	~
» Ensure Maintenance of Security Technology Implementations	-	-	-	~
» Incident Report Documentation System	-	-	-	~
» Independent Security Assessment on 5-Year Cycle				~
VISITOR MANAGEMENT SYSTEM				
» Visitor Badging System	-	-	-	~
» Electronic Visitor Management System		~	-	-
STUDENT AND STAFF IDENTIFICATION				
» Volunteer Background Checks	-	-	-	-
» Student Identification Badges	-	-	-	~
» Smart Card Identification Badges			~	~



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TIER 2

TIER 1

# **Components Within Each Layer Defined**





#### POLICIES AND PROCEDURES COMPONENT:

Two national response models serve as the framework for local policies, procedures and response plans. For larger-scale emergencies and disasters, the National Response Framework (NRF)<sup>IK</sup> offers guiding principles that enable all response partners to prepare for and provide a unified response to disasters and emergencies—from the smallest incident to the largest catastrophe. The term "response" (as defined by NRF) includes taking immediate action to save lives, protect property and the environment and meet basic human needs. Response also includes the execution of emergency plans and actions to support short-term recovery. The NRF also describes how agencies, such as schools, can work together with communities, tribes, states, the federal government and private partners.

Secondly, the National Incident Management System (NIMS)<sup>15</sup> is a comprehensive national design for conducting incident management. NIMS provides the template, while the NRF provides the structure and mechanisms for incident management. A key component of NIMS is the Incident Command System (ICS).<sup>16</sup> which provides a standardized approach for incident management, regardless of cause, size, location or complexity. By using ICS during incidents, schools and districts will be able to more effectively work with the responders in their communities.

To maximize success, effective management of school emergencies requires training, preparation and planning. Schools are responsible for anticipating and preparing to respond to a variety of emergencies. The policies and procedures outlined below will help empower the students and staff to respond in an emergency, closely aligned with the phases of emergency management:

Prevention/Mitigation: Staff should be given the training and opportunity through a continuous process to identify actions addressing hazards from all possible sources and to reduce the potential for an emergency to occur. Examples could include educating students and staff about recognizing and reporting suspicious behaviors and persons and addressing gaps in measures to control access to school facilities.

Preparedness: Districts should develop community-wide security and emergency preparedness planning groups, using the ICS framework. This includes establishing standard emergency response plans and practicing skills, drills and other exercises to evaluate both the response capabilities of a school and the effectiveness of their all-hazards planning. Staff and students should be prepared to recognize and respond to emergency situations with options for appropriate action.

Response: School employees should understand their roles and expectations in responding to an emergency, both during and after the emergency. Additionally, students can be taught different skills for dealing with an emergency.

Recovery: Following a disaster, a district has a responsibility to parents and school personnel to provide direct support and serve as the liaison between community resources and those in need, including both short- and long-term recovery; this responsibility can include monitoring and responding to student and staff health status and mental health and psychological response.





### **School and District Emergency Protocols Defined**

#### TIER 1

A. School and District Emergency Roles & Responsibilities Defined. Each school district should formally adopt through board policy the NRF and NIMS developed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). When adopting NRF and NIMS, a school district should implement an ICS within the entire organization as the coordinating link between multiple agencies and jurisdictions in an emergency response. Each district should adopt ICS as the management structure to be used in school and district EOPs<sup>17</sup>, ensuring that plans developed include any elements that are required by state law.

NIMS uses a core set of concepts, principles, procedures, processes, standards and terminology that should be integrated with school emergency management practices. The collective use of NIMS across all local incident response agencies, including K-12 schools, creates a common operating picture and, ultimately, more efficient and effective response. Furthermore, in the event of a large-scale incident crossing multiple jurisdictions and disciplines, NIMS unites all response teams across all participating jurisdictions and facilitates and draws assistance from outlying communities when needed based on the size and complexity of the incident.

At a minimum, key district personnel should complete these NIMS trainings:

- Safety Team Members & Backups—ICS 100SCa<sup>18</sup>
- District Crisis Plan Developers—ICS 100SCa and IS 362<sup>19</sup>


A prerequisite for developing EOPs and setting other security related policies and procedures is the creation of collaborative planning teams. Operational planning is best performed by teams and ideally led by full-time district safety and security directors (see below). Planning teams should include representatives from a wide range of school personnel, including, but







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


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» Signage Diversing Vestors to a Designated Entrance	10		2	A.
» Apply CPTED Principles to Promote Territorial Reinforcement	1	A.	X.	X
» Trespassing. Video Surveillance and Access Hot Teadon Signage	10		1	X
» Property Positioned Exercise Lights	1	1	2	X
» Debris Clearance	1	A.	A.	X,
» Gaus a Enranzes			A.	X
» Landszaping w Connol Wolds Access		1	2	X.
» Lighting to Enhance Video Sum allance				A.
COMMUNICATION				
» Audible Mass Notification for Students and Staff	10	1	¥,	V.
» Local Area Two-Way Radio System Benvicen Office and Scaff		1		${}^{\mathbf{P}}$
» Visual Indexnors Speefle o Razard			A.	X
» Digital Law-Band Radio System Connected to District-Wide System				2
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ACCESS CONTROL				
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» Electronic Access Gauss				N.
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» PV Canera Coverage		1	¥.	X
» Latering Decastan Analysis:		1	¥.	X
» Parimeter Video kralj ties				X
» People Identification at Gauss or Points of Europ				1







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
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
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 BUILDING PERIMETER LAYER				
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» Palley Escabilished for Connol of Exaction Openings	-	-	-	
» Kar Control Procedures	-	-	~	P
» Complexe Discribured America System (DAS) Sile Summy	-	~	-	
PEOPLE (ROLES AND TRAINING)				
» Staff Trained to Lock/Unlock Doors per Policy	-	-	-	×
» Tistur Hanagement Polig/Process Training	-	1	~	
ARCHITECTURAL				
» Signage (Dinocing to Appropriate Areas)	1	1	-	×
» Apply CPTED Principles Allowing Natural Access Control and Sum officient	1	~	~	
» Secured Vectorie	1	~	~	۲
» Emergency Building Access System for Finalizav Enforcement	~	~	~	
» DAS (New Construction Reprotein)	1	~	~	۲
» One Way Film on Exceptor Windows to Prevent Visual Access	~	~	~	
» Security Film on Basefor Deer Vision Panels and Sidelings	1	~	~	
Ballistic Security Class for Exector Door Vision Panels and Sidelines			~	
+ COMMUNICATION				
» Public Address System	1	1	1	
» Main Ency Door Incorean with two Way Communications		1	~	٧
» Audible and Maxal Maxs Redflexion Tied to Districs Wide Spram				٧
> Unity Communisation Systems With Video Surveillance and Access Control				×
ACCESS CONTROL				
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» Paerod Resided Kay Byson	1	1	1	×
» Kaj Haragenen: System	1	1	~	٧
» Cylindæ Degping With Indicator	1	1	1	×
» Door Status Monitoring	1	1	1	×
<ul> <li>Electronic Access Control of Primary Entrances</li> </ul>	1	1	1	
VIDEO SURVEILLANCE				
» Video Insursum at Visitur Encance Poince	1	1	1	
» Interfor, Flaed Camera Coverage for All Entrance Points	1	1	1	×
» Wide Dynamie Range Cameras (When Conditions Require)			1	×
» Excelor, Rood Camera Coverage at All Erroy Polines			A.	×
» Extracting Decession Analysies at Encry Points			1	×
DETECTION AND ALARMS				
» Investor Domestor System on all Exercise Access Points		1	X	×
» Innsien Dewelan System Manipred 747	1			×
» Partitional Invusion Deposition			X	×
» Auromated Threat Detection				÷







### » QUICKFIND

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


### Campus Safety CONFERENCE 2019

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES				
<ul> <li>Cazaroan Deers Diesel and Lacked When Desipted</li> </ul>	10	1	1	1
PEOPLE (ROLES AND TRAINING)			_	
» Teaders, Staff and Substrums Trained on Emergency Proceeds	100	1	1	10
ARCHITECTURAL				
» Security Film on Door Vision Panels and Sidelines	100	1	1	1
» "Karow-Lite" Spie Cazaroon Doors with Blinds	1	1	1	8
» Comparimentalize Building with Cress-Contidor Doors	10	1	1	1
» Reinbreed Walls at Sheber in Place Areas (Kew Construction)	1			N.
» Salery/Security Optimization of Classroom Door Installation (New Construction)	10			1
+ COMMUNICATION				
» Public Address System	1			1
» E-111 Added to Phone System (No Codes)	1	1		X
» Teo-way Intereen System With Call Borons		1	1	1
» Duress Burton System - Office and Classroom		1		×.
» In Building Emergency Communication System			1	1
» Distributed America System (DLS)			1	1
» Mass Kooffesdon Tied to District-Wide System			1	1
» Building-Wide Communication via Duccide Calls (with record call option)				1
» lise of Mobile Applications and Social Media				1
ACCESS CONTROL				
<ul> <li>Office, Stateson or Security Dispoton Function Lodis</li> </ul>	1	1	-	1
» Stand Alone Electronic Lack: With Fab			1	1
» Kenwarked Electronic Locks				1
VIDEO SURVEILLANCE				
» Fixed Camera Deverage of All Common Areas	100	1	1	1
» Fixed Camera Coverage of Vestibule and/or Lobby Area		1	~	1
» Fixed Camera Coverage of Scalwells, Hallways and Reservon Environs		1	1	1
» Fixed Camera Coverage of Restricted Areas		10	1	1
» Audio Analytic Integration			1	1
+DETECTION AND ALARMS				
Intrusion Detector System CoveringAll Hallways and Public Acces		1	1	1
» Intrusion and Duress (Panie) System Unified		1	1	1
Intrusion Detection System CoveringALI Classrooms			1	1
<ul> <li>Unified Communication and Detector System Manipred 108</li> </ul>				~
» United Communication and Detection System Monitored by District-Wide SUC				1
» Karns, Communications, Video Surveillance and Access Connel Unified				1
» Amonaued Threat Detection				1

# PASS Checklist/Assessment Tool







### **Checklist/Assessment**



	TIER 1	TIER 2	TIER 3	TIER 4	Our Status			
 CLASSROOM/INTERIOR PERIMETER LAYER					Achieved	In	Future Need	Not
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES					Achieveu	Progress		Required
» Classroom Doors Closed and Locked When Occupied	٢	1	1	X				
PEOPLE (ROLES AND TRAINING)								
» Teachers, Staff and Substitutes Trained on Emergency Protocols	٢	~	~	1				
ARCHITECTURAL								
» Security Film on Door Vision Panels and Sidelites	٢	1	~	1				
» "Narrow-Lite" Style Classroom Doors with Blinds	٢	1	~	V				
» Compartmentalize Building with Cross-Corridor Doors	٢	1	1	×				
» Reinforced Walls at Shelter in Place Areas (New Construction)	1	~	~	1				
» Safety/Security Optimization of Classroom Door Installation (New Construction)	1	-	-	-				

# Who else is involved?

- Secure Schools Alliance

   (www.secureschoolsalliance.org)
- Safe and Sound Schools

   (www.safeandsoundschools.org)
- NFPA 3000 (<u>www.nfpa.org</u>)
- The Police Foundation (<u>www.policefoundation.org</u>)



www.passk12.org









# **PASS Guidelines Recognized**



- Recommended
  - Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Commission Report – pg 84 http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/MSDHS/CommissionReport.pdf
  - State of Ohio School Security Report & Recommendations – PASS Checklist/Assessment tool included in Appendix
- Referenced
  - NFPA 3000 Active Shooter and Hostile Event Response (ASHER) – Chapter 5 & 9
  - Federal Commission on School Safety pg. 122 <u>https://www2.ed.gov/documents/school-safety/school-safety-report.pdf</u>



FINAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COMMISSION ON School Safety



Presented to the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES


December 18, 2018



# **Emerging Technologies**

### **Biometric Technologies – Facial Recognition**









- Weapons and prohibited item detection
- Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning Integrated with Video









### Questions




# Let's see what we learned



#### What About Us Project?

# A powerful expression of grief, memory, and hope....



https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=5ZbCp 9 nXY&utm source=e mail&utm medium=email



# **Thank You**





## Questions





#### Reminders

- Access to the presentation
- Evaluations
- Social Media

# **Contact Info**

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f in
@CampusSafetyMag
#CSC19

#MakingCampusesSaferTOGETHER



The Partner Alliance for Safer Schools (PASS) is:

- (a) 501c3 non-profit
- (b) An industry organization with the purpose of increasing security equipment sales
- (c) A cross functional team of community, school and industry professionals and experts



The mission of PASS is:

- (a) To promote the industry and their products
- (b) To provide educators with the tools they need to adopt a layered and tiered approach to securing their environments
- (c) To bring gun control conversation to the table
- (d) Help school administrators answer the questions around what to do and how to prioritize safety and security

**Campus Sa** 

Conference 2019

Which statements are true about "Layered Security":

- (a) Works from the outside in
- (b) Defeats adversarial behavior
- (c) Detects adversarial behavior
- (d) Contains components
- (e) Deters adversarial behavior
- (f) Delays adversarial behavior



The 5 Perimeter Layers in the PASS Guidelines are:

- (a) Community
- (b) District Wide
- (c) Responder
- (d) Staff
- (e) Property
- (f) Parking Lot
- (g) Building
- (h) Classroom/Interior

B, E, F, G, H





Components of the PASS Guidelines are:

- (a) Policies and Procedures
- (b) Response and Recovery
- (c) People (Roles and Training)
- (d) Architectural
- (e) Security
- (f) Communication
- (g) Access Control
- (h) Video Surveillance
- (i) Alarms and Detection







The Policies and Procedures and People (roles and training) are the two most important components.

(a) True (b) False



The Policies and Procedures and People (Roles and Training) are the two least expensive components to implement.

(a) True

(b) False





Security Team Member Groups include:

- (a) Security Director
- (b) First Responders
- (c) Community
- (d) School Administration
- (e) Integration Team
- (f) IT Team





Which is true about most barricade devices:

- (a) They violate life safety codes
- (b) They violate ADA Law
- (c) They prohibit access from the corridor side of the door
- (d) They may invalidate the fire rating of a door

All of the Above





There are no documented instances of an active shooter breaching a locked door.

(a) True

(b) False



